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Apparent Authority in Computer Searches:
Sidestepping the Fourth Amendment
John-RobertSkrabanek'
INTRODUCTION

an era in which information storage is increasingly digitized, the
computer password is king. As we undergo a massive transition away
from paper records, more than anything else it is the password that will
protect our most private files. This statement holds true for all types of
data, from harmless personal digital photos to important state security
documents. However, in contrast to the "brick and mortar" world, passwords
in the digital context do not manifest themselves in tangible ways. For
example, unlike a visible combination lock on a suitcase, frequently police
may never know if a computer is password protected unless they make the
effort to search for such protection. Should the legal standards that govern
searches in this context be any different from those in a non-computer
context? For a narrow subset of third-party consent searches, the answer
is yes. Currently, the standards that control third-party consent searches in
the area of digital storage are not adequate to protect the individual against
unnecessary governmental intrusion.
This Note examines the search and seizure doctrine of "apparent
authority" as applied to computer hard drives. Part I introduces the
background and history of apparent authority in the "brick and mortar"
world. Part II examines how the doctrine has narrowed over time to suit
items that society considers especially private. Part III scrutinizes the
current jurisprudence of apparent authority in the computer context, noting
that authorities have frequently ignored or warped the proper inquiry that
should be made in various situations. Part III also proposes that when
searching hard drives, additional inquiries must be made by law enforcement
officials before courts should allow these searches to pass constitutional
scrutiny. Finally, Part IV offers other special considerations and issues
regarding apparent authority in the context of computer searches.
N

i B.A., 2005, Political Science, University of Kentucky; J.D. expected May 2009,
University of Kentucky College of Law.
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APPARENT AUTHORITY'S HISTORICAL ROOTS

A. Common Authority Beginnings
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally
provides the public the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.' Thus, warrantless searches are deemed "perse unreasonable"
save for "exigent circumstances" 3 or based upon a party's valid consent
to a search.' Any evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search
is excluded at trial.' Numerous exceptions arise, however, when law
enforcement officials perform searches based upon an objectively
reasonable but misinformed belief about a particular fact relating to their
authority to conduct the search, resulting in some evidence found pursuant
6
to a warrantless search admissible at trial.
For consent searches, the doctrine of "common authority" allows
warrantless searches founded upon the consent of one party who possesses
common control over property as against an absent, non-consenting party
with whom that control is shared. 7 First outlined in UnitedStates v. Matlock,
the Supreme Court defined common authority not merely as based upon
a property interest, but as requiring evidence of "mutual use" by one
generally having "joint access or control for most purposes." 8 If no mutual
use ispresent, then there must be some form of assumption of the risk
by the non-consenting party that a co-inhabitant would have the right to
permit a search of a common area. 9 It is always the government's burden
to establish that common authority exists over the premises, 0 and as with
all consent searches, consent must be "freely and voluntarily given.""
Likewise, the scope of a consent search may not exceed what the consenting
party has authorized.' Finally, the standard for measuring the scope of the
consent objectively asks what the typical reasonable person would have

2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

3 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.443,470-71 (1971).

4 See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1,9 (1982); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973).
5 See Mapp v.Ohio,367 U.S.643, 654 (1961);Weeks v.United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914).
6 See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (discussing reliance on retroactively

unconstitutional statutes); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,913 (1984) (discussing reliance
on defective warrants).
7 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (974)0
8 Id. at '71 n.7.
9 Id.
io Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 18i (199o).
i1 Florida v. Royer, 46o U.S. 491,497 (1983).
12 Florida v. Jimeno, 5oo U.S. 248, 251-52 (991.
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understood by the exchange with the officer. 3 Considering the estimation
that as many as 98% of all warrantless searches are conducted via some
form of consent, the judicial creation, recognition, and enforcement of the
common authority doctrine has a serious impact upon individuals' Fourth
Amendment rights.14 Simply put, the validity of the particular third-party
consent is critical to whether a great number of warrantless searches will
withstand scrutiny in courts across the United States.
B. Expansion Into ApparentAuthority
Following Matlock, in Illinoisv. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court extended
common authority further into an arena now deemed "apparent authority." 15
In Rodriguez, the defendant was suspected of drug possession and physical
assault, but officers did not have a warrant to search his apartment. 6 They
conducted a warrantless search pursuant to the consent of a woman named
Gail Fischer. Fischer represented that she shared the apartment with the
defendant, had clothes and furniture inside, and unlocked the apartment
door with a key. 7 Fischer indicated several times that the apartment
was "our[s]" (referring to herself and the defendant), but never clearly
indicated whether she currently lived with the defendant or had only done
so in the past. 8 Based upon factual findings that Fischer had not lived
with Rodriguez for over a month before the time of the search, had taken
most of her household items with her in the move, had only occasionally
frequented Rodriguez's apartment, and had never gone there by herself
when he was not home, the Court found that the state had not carried its
burden of showing that Fischer exhibited the adequate amount of common
authority to uphold the search. 9 Nevertheless, relying on past authority
indicating police action generally only need be "reasonable" but not always
"correct," 0 the Court excused the officers' mistakes and instead relied on
their objective, good faith belief about the living situation., Ultimately, the
Court held that a "warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent
of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe
to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not

13

Id. at 251.

14

1 JOSHUA

DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §

2oo6) (estimated by one detective to be as high as 98%).
15 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 187.
16 Id. at 179-8o.
17 Id.
18 Id.at 179.
19 Id. at 181-82.
20
21

Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.

16.oi,

at 261 (4th ed.
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do so.""2 Therefore, actual authority is not necessary when the reasonable
belief of apparent authority exists. Stated differently, courts only need to
find eithercommon authority or the reasonable belief of apparent authority
for third-party consent searches to be valid.
While apparent authority expands the reaches of the power to conduct
a warrantless search even further than common authority alone, several
limiting factors prevent law enforcement from abusing apparent authority
by conducting more warrantless consent-based searches than necessary.
Foremost, the reasonableness of an officer's determination concerning
the authority of a consenting party is judged by the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the search. 3 Furthermore, warrantless entry in
light of an ambiguous situation is unlawful unless actual authority exists.2 4
An example of this latter requirement can be found in the D.C. Circuit
case of UnitedStates v. Whitfield."s In Whitfield, the defendant was suspected
of robbery, and his mother consented to a search of his room when he was
not present.2 6 The search was originally upheld upon apparent authority
grounds but was later overturned upon doubts as to whether the defendant
was merely an occupant of his mother's house or in a landlord-tenant
relationship with her (in which case she would not have had the authority to
consent to such a search).2 7 The court of appeals stated unambiguously that
the burden to prove the reasonableness of reliance upon apparent authority
"cannot be met if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless
proceed without making further inquiry." 8 The court added that "[i]f the
agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it unclear whether
the property about to be searched is subject to 'mutual use' by the person
giving consent," then the police cannot constitutionally proceed with the
search. 29
Another example of the duty to investigate ambiguous circumstances is
found in UnitedStates v. Kimoana,where the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the conviction of a felon for possessing firearms.3" In Kimoana, the
defendant's friend consented to a search of a hotel room registered in the
defendant's name, and the officer found a long-barreled revolver inside
the room. 31 Despite the fact that the defendant's attempt to suppress the
evidence was ultimately denied, the court clearly stated that "where an
Id. at 179.
23 Id. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-22 (1968)).
24 Rodniguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89.
25 United States v. Whitfield, 939 E2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
26 Id. at 1073.
27 Id. at 1074-75.
28 Id. at 1075.
22

29

Id.

30 United States v. Kimoana, 383 F3d 1215, 1219 (ioth Cir. 2004).
31

Id. at

1220.
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officer is presented with ambiguous facts related to authority, he or she has
a duty to investigate further before relying on the consent."32 Case history,
then, makes it clear that apparent authority is a powerful tool used by law
enforcement to legally conduct warrantless searches. The onus, however,
is entirely on the state to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the nature of
the apparent authority before proceeding, so as not to create the potential
33
for abusive or haphazard searches.
II.

THE NARROWING OF APPARENT AUTHORITY OVER TIME

Despite the generally broad power given by courts to police officers
in reliance upon the apparent authority of third parties under Matlock and
Rodriguez, the scope of the doctrine has narrowed significantly over time. In
Stonerv. California,the Supreme Court warned that "[ojur decisions make
clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded
by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of
'apparent authority."' 34 In Stoner, the search of an armed robbery suspect's
hotel room without his consent was deemed unlawful even though it was
conducted with the consent of a hotel employee. 3 The Court opined that
third-party consent, no matter how voluntarily and unambiguously given,
cannot validate a warrantless search when the circumstances provide no
basis for a reasonable belief that shared or exclusive authority to permit
36
inspection exists in the third party giving consent.
Following Stoner's lead, courts across the country began to limit the ability
of apparent authority to validate searches when the items being searched
were considered more private. The seminal limiting case is UnitedStates v.
Block, where a mother's consent to a search of her son's bedroom while he
was not home was initially deemed valid based upon apparent authority,
but such authority did not extend to the padlocked footlocker at the end of
his bed. 37 The officers began a search of the defendant's room and noted a
lock on the trunk. They proceeded to ask the defendant's mother if she had
a key to open it, and she indicated she did not. Nevertheless, the officers
were able to open it with sheer blunt force. 3 Fact-finding by the trial court
indicated that the trunk "had been [the defendant's] private property over
a period of around ten years; that during this time it was kept in his room,
locked while he was away; and that neither his mother nor anyone else had
32 Id. at 1222 (emphasis added).

33 See also United States v. Rosario, 962 F2d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 1992); Kaspar v. City of
Hobbs, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1319 (D.N.M. 2000).

34 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964).
35 Id. at 487-88.
36 Id. at 489.
37 United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978).
38 Id. at 537.
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means of access to its interior nor permission to open it."'39 Invalidating the
search, the court noted the extreme protection that should be accorded to
our most private items, such as locked boxes:
Common experience of life . . . surely teaches all of us that the law's
"enclosed spaces" mankind's valises, suitcases, footlockers, strong boxes,
etc. are frequently the objects of his highest privacy expectations, and that
the expectations may well be at their most intense when such effects are
deposited temporarily or kept semi-permanently in public places or in
places under the general control of another. 4°
The 1984 Supreme Court case of UnitedStates v. Karo41 further extended
the rationale of Block. In Karo, police were tracking the location of a beeper
they had put in a large can of ether that was suspected of being used to make
cocaine. 4 The beeper was transported to a location owned by an individual
not under investigation and with an individual privacy interest unique from
the others under police surveillance. 43 Justice O'Connor, in concurrence,
agreed with the Court in upholding the search of the entire home, but only
because the beeper pointed to the location of a more generalized area to be
searched. In the alternative, she indicated that "[the] privacy interest in a
home itself need not be coextensive with a privacy interest in the contents
or movements of everything situated inside the home .... A homeowner's
consent to a search of the home may not be effective consent to a search of
a closed object inside the home."' Supplementing this analysis, she specified
that "when a guest in a private home has a private container to which the
homeowner has no right of access ... the homeowner ...lacks the power to
'4
give effective consent to the search of the closed container.
In United States v. Salinas-Cano, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
followed the Supreme Court's indications from Karo by overturning a search
46
of the defendant's suitcase that he had left at his girlfriend's apartment.
The defendant was arrested after a controlled drug buy, but officers wanted
to search his girlfriend's apartment for his possessions, admittedly having
no probable cause to do so and with authority based only upon her valid
consent.47 The apartment search was initially upheld on the rationale that
because the girlfriend had control over the apartment, she had control of

39 Id. at 538.
40 Id. at 541.
41 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
42 Id. at 708.

43 Id.at
44
45
46
47

720.

Id. at 725 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 726.
United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.d 861, 866 (ioth Cir.
Id. at 862.

1992).
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everything in it and could consent to the search." Despite this holding,
the court of appeals deemed the suitcase search unlawful because the
girlfriend had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to a search of
her boyfriend's personal effects. The court indicated that the suitcase is an
object long equated with a heightened expectation of privacy and that the
searching officers were aware that the girlfriend had verbally discharged
ownership of it.49 Furthermore, the court warned:
It is not enough for the officer to testify, as he did here, that he thought
the consenting party had joint access and control. The "apparent authority"
doctrine does not empower the police to legitimize a search merely by the
incantation of the phrase. The Supreme Court's analysis of this subject
instead rests entirely on the reasonablenessof the officer's belief.50
Consequently, courts do not treat apparent authority as some sort of
panacea that releases state agents from the obligation to conduct reasonable
inquiries into the nature of third-party consent. To the contrary, SalinasCaro and Karo represent the norm rather than the exception. Other
examples of courts deeming searches invalid under an apparent authority
analysis include the Ninth Circuit, where a suitcase was in the consenter's
apartment;"1 the Fifth Circuit, where cabinets were locked within the
consenter's home;5" the D.C. Circuit, where a government employee's desk
was located in the consenter's office;53 the Third Circuit, where a garage
under the sole possession of a husband with one key was accessed under
his wife's consent;54 and the Eastern District of Louisiana, where a closed
overnight bag was found in the consenter's closet.55 Each of these cases
demonstrates the limitation courts place on apparent authority in a context
of anything less than shared ownership or with items normally associated
with a heightened expectation of privacy. The more private that society
generally considers the item to be searched, or the more obvious it is that
the particular item only has one owner, the more likely courts are to be
wary of searches premised exclusively upon apparent authority consent.

48 Id.

49 Id.at 865.
50 Id. (citation omitted) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89 (1990)).

51 United States v. Wilson, 536 E2d 883 (9th Cir. 1976).
52 Holzhey v. United States, 223 Ezd 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
53 United States v. Blok, 188 E2d 1o9 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
54 U.S. ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970).
55 United States v. Poole, 307 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. La. 1969).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

IIl.

[VOL. 97

APPARENT AUTHORITY IN THE

COMPUTER SEARCH AND SEIZURE CONTEXT

A. Ignoringthe Katz and Rodriguez Requirements
In 1967, Justice Harlan stated in his famous concurrence in the landmark
case of Katz v. Untied States that a search violates the Fourth Amendment
when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable.5 6 This hallmark of Fourth Amendment
analysis is still adhered to in modern search and seizure jurisprudence.
Thus, the first and most important inquiry that must be made as to the
constitutionality of any search with a new technology is to what extent the
subject exercised caution and care to keep the area private. In 2001, the
Court extended the rationale of Katz in Kyllo v. United States, which held
that the warrantless use of advanced technology to gather information
regarding the interior of a home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical intrusion is unconstitutional. 7 Combined, these
holdings establish a framework for any case involving a search that uses a
new technology which the public has no knowledge of or for a search of a
new physical area (ex. an entire computer hard drive).
The key questions under Katz and Kyllo that must be answered before a
search can be upheld are to what extent the individual took steps to keep
his possessions private and whether society recognizes this expectation
of privacy as a reasonable one. Unfortunately, cases involving apparent
authority searches of computer hard drives seem to circumvent these
questions altogether by failing to establish whether or not the user had any
password protections on the computer before initiating a search. 8 In this
line of cases, no question is ever posed as to what extent the individual
intended to keep his files private. What is more, these cases also ignore the
requirements from the Rodriguez progeny that officers conduct a reasonable
inquiry into ambiguous cases, because if a user has password protected his
computer or particular files, then obviously no common authority over that
property can exist.
B. United States v. Buckner and United States v. Andrus
as the IncorrectApproach
There are a variety of examples of modern courts allowing officers
to ignore the requirement that they make a reasonable inquiry into the
circumstances of an ambiguous apparent authority situation. By allowing
56 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
57 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2oo1).

58 See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 473 E3d 5 5 , (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Andrus,
483 E3d 711 (ioth Cir. 2007).
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such searches, these courts have created the incentive for law enforcement
not to ask questions, an incentive contrary to the long line of cases following
Rodriguez and Stonerthat attempted to limit the power of apparent authority
in unclear situations.5 9
The Fourth Circuit case of UnitedStatesv. Buckner provides an excellent
example of a court creating such an incentive.' In Buckner,Michelle Buckner
was suspected of wire and mail fraud after authorities found multiple eBay
accounts opened in her name.6 She informed police that she knew nothing
of such illegal transactions, and that while the computer was rented in her
own name, the only reason she used it was to occasionally play solitaire.6"
When the defendant, her husband, was not present, she consented to a full
search of the computer, telling officers "to take whatever [they] needed"
and that she "want[ed] to be as cooperative as she could be."63 Despite the
fact that the computer was initially turned on at the time of the search, the
officers shut it down and performed a "mirroring" procedure where they
copied the entire contents of the hard drive; this procedure did not include
restarting the computer or checking for any sort of password. 64 Later, the
defendant attempted to have the evidence suppressed for lack of actual or
apparent authority. At a suppression hearing, he testified that authentication
was in fact required to use the computer and that he was the only one who
knew the password. 65 This testimony was accepted without contradiction,
and officers admitted that they had made no further inquiries as to the
ownership of the computer with the defendant's wife, instead relying on
the fact that the computer was leased in her name and located in a common
living area of the home. 66
In analyzing the validity of the search, the court agreed that Michelle
had no actual authority.67 Here it relied on the rationale from Block that,
"[a]lthough common authority over a general area confers actual authority
to consent to a search of that general area, it does not 'automatically...
extend to the interiors of every discrete enclosed space capable of search
within the area.' 68 Still, the court believed that apparent authority was
reasonable under the circumstances, despite Michelle's statements that she
was "not computer-savvy" and that she used the computer solely to "play

59
6o
61
6z
63

See supra Part II.
Buckner, 473 F3d at 551.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 553.
Id.

64 Id.
65 Id.

66 Id. at 553, 55567 Id.at 554.
68 Id. (quoting United States v. Block, 590 Ezd 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)).
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games. ' 69 The court did not discuss the lack of questions from the officers
regarding Michelle's ownership or use of the computer. However, the
court erroneously attributed significance to the fact that while the search
was taking place, "nothing the officers saw indicated that any computer
files were encrypted or password-protected. ' 70 Rather, this should have
been deemed irrelevant because it did not occur at the time of the initial
inquiry. Officers are obligated to investigate any ambiguous situation of
ownership before they begin a search, not during it. Case history further
supports this view. According to the Sixth Circuit in UnitedStatesv. Morgan,
facts acquired after the initial inquiry "that might undermine the initial
reasonable conclusion of third-party apparent authority are generally
7
immaterial." '
It might be argued that objectively there was no ambiguity to the
question of ownership, since based on what was known to officers at the
time, it appeared Michelle did, in fact, have common authority over the
computer. Still, the minimal step of simply checking to see if the computer
was password protected would clearly have created such ambiguity. In a
sense, the court of appeals recognized this when it stated in a footnote of
the opinion, "[w]e do not hold that the officers could rely upon apparent
authority to search while simultaneously using mirroring or other technology
to intentionally avoid discovery of password or encryption protection put
in place by the user. '72 With this statement, the court is exactly right. The
problem, however, is that by not performing an initial check for password
protection, law enforcement is purposefully avoiding the question
altogether; the majority has implicitly held what it explicitly stated not to
hold. More importantly, the burden of doing such a spot check is absurdly
minimal. It would take literally seconds to complete, and the answer to the
examination is, in reality, critical to the constitutionality of the search, as it
constitutes the key determinant of whether the belief of apparent authority
is objectively reasonable.
In the Tenth Circuit, Untied States v. Andrus acts as another example
of courts seemingly skirting the issue of password protection. 73 Andrus
involved the investigation of a website providing users access to child
pornography, which led to the suspicion that a computer in the Andrus
household also contained images of this nature.7 4 Federal agents did not
find the defendant at home, but instead found the defendant's 91-year-old
father, Dr. Bailey Andrus.75 The defendant Ray Andrus's computer was
69 Id. at 555.
70 Id.
71 United States v. Morgan, 435 F3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 2oo6).
72 Buckner, 473 F3d at 556 n.3 (emphasis added).
73 United States v. Andrus, 483 E3d 713 (ioth Cir. 2007).
74 Id. at 713.
75 Id.
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in Ray's bedroom with the door open, so the agents proceeded to ask a
few questions before they received consent from Dr. Andrus "to search
the house and any computers in it."'7 6 The agents questioned whether Ray
paid rent and whether Dr. Andrus had free access to his son's bedroom. Dr.
Andrus indicated that his son did not pay rent, but that if the door were
closed to his son's room he would always knock before entering.77 However,
the officers did not ask the much more obvious question of whether Dr.
Andrus owned the computer or even used it if he was in fact the owner.
From there, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special
Agent Kanatzar proceeded to use a combination of computer hardware
and software known as EnCase to copy the entire contents of Ray's hard
drive without ever turning on the computer." EnCase "allowed him direct
access to the hard drive without first determining whether a user name or
password were needed."79 Only later, upon examining the contents of the
hard drive, did Kanatzar realize that Ray's files were password protected. 0
At some point afterthe search had commenced, a further inquiry was posed
to Dr. Andrus regarding his apparent authority to consent to the search.
Dr. Andrus indicated that the computer in his son's room was the only one
8
in the house and that the Internet service was part of the cable package. 1
About this time, RayAndrus himself became aware of the search because his
father called him at work.8 The special agents then decided to discontinue
83
the search.
After indictment, Andrus attempted to have the evidence suppressed,
arguing his father's consent lacked both actual and apparent authority.s4 The
district court agreed that Dr. Andrus lacked actual authority, considering he
"did not know how to use the computer, had never used the computer, and
did not know the user name that would have allowed him to access the
computer."8 5 Yet after acknowledging that the issue of apparent authority
was a "'close call,"' the court concluded that the agents' belief in Dr.
Andrus's authority "was reasonable up until the time they learned there

76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 713-14.
79 Id. For more information about EnCase, see Greg Johnson, Dealingwith E-Data: Using
Encase in E-Discovery, Part II, LAWYER'S PC (Thomson/West, Rochester, NY), Apr. 1, 2oo4.
Note that EnCase can also recover data that the user had previously "deleted" from his hard
drive, id., and that "EnCase has been successfully admitted into evidence in thousands of
criminal and civil court cases." Id.
8o Andrus, 483 E3d at 714.
81 Id.
8z Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 715.

85 Id.
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was only one computer in the house." 6 The district court concluded Dr.
Andrus had apparent authority because of the following facts: first, the email address used to register with the service providing child pornography
was bandrus@kc.rr.com, an address associated with Dr. Bailey Andrus;
second, Dr. Andrus told the investigating agents he paid for the Internet
service; third, the agents were aware that more than one individual lived in
the household; fourth, Ray Andrus's bedroom was not locked, so it was safe
to assume other household members could enter the room freely; and fifth,
Ray's computer was in plain view upon entry into the bedroom."2
At the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit upheld the search, but again
noted the duty for an officer presented with ambiguous facts to investigate
further before relying on potentially illegitimate consent.88 Furthermore,
it conceded the ever-growing amount of value individuals place on the
privacy of their home computers, stating that, "[flor most people, their
computers are their most private spaces."89 This sentiment is especially
evident in the modern computer era through the increased usage of
thumbprint readers for laptops and the growing number of individuals who
keep data stored in digital rather than paper formats (examples include
taxes, business documents, spreadsheets, etc.). The biggest concession the
Andrus majority made, however, was the recognition that, unlike traditional
locked boxes where the lock is readily visible from the outside, determining
when a computer is "locked" via password protection is impossible without
first starting up the computer and attempting to access particular files." In
the court's own words, "[a] critical issue in assessing a third party's apparent
authority to consent to the search of a home computer... is whether law
enforcement knows or should reasonably suspect because of surrounding
circumstances that the computer is password protected."91
Despite these issues, the majority believed that the situation was
not ambiguous enough to begin with for the special agents to have to ask
any further questions about Dr. Andrus's authority.9 The court was not
persuaded by arguments that the burden on officers to make a more detailed
query in the situation was extremely minimal.93 The problem with the
majority's approach, however, is that it creates the same incentive found in
Buckner, i.e., the incentive not to investigate uncertainty. This rationale will
find difficulty aligning with previous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
86 Id.
87 Id.

88 Id. at 717 (quoting United States v.Kimoana, 383 E3d

1215, 1222 (ioth Cit. 2oo4)).
89 Id. at 718 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Gourde, 44o F3d IO65, 1077
(9th Cir. 2oo6) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)).

90 Id. at 78-19.
91 Id.at 719.
92 Id. at 721.
93 Id.
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on the subject, considering apparent authority was never intended to be a
sweeping way for law enforcement to justify searches they suspected they
would not normally be able to perform; rather, dating all the way back to
Stoner, the Supreme Court has consistently worked to narrow the apparent
authority doctrine, not to broaden its reaches.94 More in-depth analysis
demonstrates that Buckner and Andrus are inconsistent with the Rodriguez
requirements.
C. A Better Approach-The Andrus Dissentand Trulock v. Freh
While the majority of courts have allowed apparent authority hard drive
searches to be upheld despite the undiscovered password objection, some
case law favors the opposite result. These courts have keenly recognized
that password protection can make or break the validity of the consenter's
apparent authority and the key inquiries that must be made literally
take but seconds during an investigation. Based largely upon these two
premises, these judges have made the wise decision to require more from
law enforcement in such a context, not less.
The best example of this line of reasoning is from Judge McKay in
the Andrus dissent. Here, Judge McKay recognized the tendency for
law enforcement to desire to bypass the password issue altogether. He
believed that the majority effectively gave a free pass to law enforcement
to "use software deliberately designed to automatically bypass computer
password protection based on third-party consent without the need to
make a reasonable inquiry regarding the presence of password protection
and the third party's access to that password." 9 Noting that password
protection is extremely commonplace for personal computers in today's
world, he also recognized the minimal burden upon law enforcement to
identify ownership, stating that "[a] simple question or two would have
sufficed." 96
Judge McKay also took note of the then newly-decided Supreme Court
consent case of Georgiav. Randolph,97 where Chief Justice Roberts explicitly
stated, "[t]o the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be
subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place
these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be
it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed." 98 Roberts' words breathe
new light into the questions jurists must ask under Katz and Kyllo. When it
94 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,488 (1964); United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 Fzd

861, 863-65 (ioth Cit.

1992).

95 United States v. Andrus, 483 E3d 711, 722 (ioth Cir. 2007) (McKay, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 724.
97 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2oo6).
98 Andrus, 483 F.3d at 723 (McKay, J., dissenting) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.
103, 135 (2oo6) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
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appears that the computer user has taken an extra step to password-protect
his files, the Roberts declaration in this context certainly suggests that no
third-party consent to a search of those files would be valid. But, what
if under Roberts' analysis, officers turn a blind eye to whether or not the
person locked his materials in the first place?
Judge McKay was reluctant in the Andrus dissent to place the burden
to speak up about Dr. Andrus's lack of ownership on Dr. Andrus himself
rather than the special agents." This is because it was not obvious to Dr.
Andrus that the EnCase software was specifically designed to bypass any
password protection but was clearly obvious to the special agents. Judge
McKay illuminated the Fourth Amendment loophole that has been created
best when he stated:
The development of computer password technology no doubt "presents a
challenge distinct from that associated with other types of" locked containers
... [However, tihe unconstrained ability of law enforcement to use forensic
software such as the EnCase program to bypass password protection without
first determining whether such passwords have been enabled does not
"exacerbate[ I"this difficulty, rather, it avoids it altogether, simultaneously
and dangerously sidestepping the Fourth Amendment in the process.1°
The McKay dissent concludes with the most pragmatic solution to the
problem, namely to require that where computer searches rely purely on
apparent authority consent, law enforcement must inquire or somehow
check for the presence of password protection. 10
Foremost, officers
should simply ask whether the would-be consenter shares ownership of
the computer or not. If the answer is no, then the inquiry ends there and
the consenter has neither actual nor apparent authority. In the alternative,
police should proceed to ask if the consenter has knowledge of a password's
presence on the system. If password protection is in fact present, it will take
but a few seconds to question the consenter's knowledge of the password
and thus ascertain whether or not there is true common authority.
Originating in the same circuit as Buckner, Trulock v. Freh'0 is a better
example of the type of inquiries officers should have made in the Andrus
case. In Trulock, the Fourth Circuit held that a live-in girlfriend lacked
both actual and apparent authority to consent to a search of her boyfriend's
computer files.0 3 The girlfriend told police that she and her boyfriend
had separate password-protected files that were inaccessible to the other
individual.' °4 Plaintiff Trulock was the former Director of the Office of
99 Id. at 724.
oo Id. at 723.
1oi Id. at 725.
1oz

Trulock v.Freh, 275 E3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).

103 Id. at403.
104 Id.
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Intelligence of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the subject of a
harassing investigation by the FBI, largely because he wrote a piece for the
NationalReview criticizing the DOE's handling of numerous administrative
Trulock's girlfriend, Conrad, was questioned at length about
affairs.'
Trulock's work at the DOE, and eventually she consented to a search of
the apartment and all the computers in it (this consent was later found to
be made under coercion)."° Despite her insistence that she and Trulock
maintained completely separate log-in identities on the computer and that
his files were independently password protected, two FBI Special Agents
searched Trulock's files for ninety minutes and later confiscated the hard
drive without a warrant.'0 7
Weeks later, Trulock and Conrad filed a Bivens suit, 08 which allows
individuals to bring a civil suit against a federal officer for damages
stemming from a constitutional violation. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia,
that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights and that Conrad
had no authority to consent to it.1 9 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, concluding that since Trulock used a password, he "affirmatively
intended to exclude Conrad and others from his personal files.""' The
court also recognized that Trulock had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his files; since he concealed his password from Conrad, he could not
possibly have assumed the risk that Conrad would assent to a common
authority search."'
Further examples where proper consideration has been given to the
issue of password protection in apparent authority searches come from the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Central District of Illinois. In United
States v. Aaron, the Sixth Circuit upheld a third-party consent search of
the defendant's computer following suspicion that he had violated child
protection laws."' In so doing, the court paid special attention to the
fact that the defendant "did not protect his computer with a password or
otherwise manifest an intention to restrict [the consenter's] access."" 3 This
fact was also properly noted by the officer on duty at the time he initially
began the search." 4 Likewise, in United States v. Smith, the Central District
of Illinois included in its list of factors supporting the third-party consent
105 Id. at 397-98.
io6 Id. at 398-4o2.
107 Id.at 398.
io8 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 097I).
io9 Trulock, 275 F3d at 399.
iio Id. at 403.
iii Id.
1Z
United States v. Aaron, 33 F App'x I8o (6th Cir. zooz).
13 Id.at 184.
114 Id.at I8z.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97

of a computer search the fact that "none of the officers who searched the
computer found passwords," indicating that this "belies Defendant's claim
of exclusive and possessory control."'15 Both of these courts astutely saw
that password protection is practically the whole ball game as to whether
the third-party consenter has apparent authority and, thus, whether the
search should be allowed.
D. PasswordsIndicatea Subjective Expectation of Privacy
It is notable that the Trulock court did something the Buckner court and
the Andrus majority did not-it weighed in its analysis the affirmative steps
that the searched party took to maintain a certain level of privacy. While
not specific to the computer context, the Fourth Circuit case of United
States v. Presslerspeaks to the issue of a defendant's expectations of privacy
when he goes to great lengths to keep an item private. 1 6 The Pressler
court overturned a third-party consent search of the defendant's locked
briefcases that a friend was looking after for safe-keeping." 7 The court
stated that, "[t]he very act of locking [the briefcases] and retaining either
the key or the combination to the locks ... was an effective expression
of the defendant's expectation of privacy."' 18 It further noted that, "the
defendant's failure to give [the consenter] a key or combination to the
locks was the clearest evidence that there was no intention on [his] part to
give ... anyone... 'access' to the locked briefcases."" 9 The only difference
between Presslerand Andrus is that the locks on Andrus's computer were
not visible while the locks on Pressler's briefcases were. This critical
examination of a subject's expectation of privacy has existed in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since 1967,120 but it never even enters the
picture when courts uphold hard drive searches based upon an apparent
authority that is shaky at best.' Rather, by dodging the issue of whether
the computer has password protection on some or all of its files, one can
never know just how private the searched party intended to keep his or her
files in the first place.
Furthermore, the refusal to recognize that password protection is
practically universalized in today's era of personal computing amounts to a
failure to take judicial notice of commonly known information. The vast
United States v. Smith, 27 E Supp. 2d i I 11, i 16 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
United States v. Pressler, 6Io Ed 12o6 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id.at 1214-15.
Id. at 1213-14.
Id. at 1214 (emphasis added).
120 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
121 See United States v. Andrus, 483 E3d 711,715 (ioth Cir. 2007) (noting that the District
Court "indicated the resolution of the apparent authority claim in favor of the government
was a 'close call"').
115
16
117
118
iH9

2oo8-2oo9]

APPARENT AUTHORITY

majority of personal computer users employ a Microsoft Windows-based
operating system, which has the ability to separate users with unique IDs
With the addition of other common operating systems
and passwords.'
such as Mac OS X and Linux (both of which have some level of password
protection available to users), almost all of today's personal computers have
at least the ability to enable password protection, and many of the operating
systems either encourage or require it upon installation. 3
Finally, one noteworthy error that theAndrus majority made in its analysis
was the recognition that computer locks are invisible and, thus, constitute
new territory for law enforcement officials.12 4 In reality, however, this is a
distinction without a difference. Not all locks exist in plain view in the
brick and mortar world either, but this reality does not stop police officers
from investigating the nature of a locking mechanism before bulldozing
through it. For example, locks on briefcases and lockers can be hidden,
while locks on high-security doors can be concealed in a keystroke or only
seen on the other side of the door. Moreover, just because "a computer
password 'lock' may not be immediately visible does not render it unlocked,"
as computers "do exhibit [some] outward signs of password protection,"
In more
such as log-in screens and screen saver reactivation passwords.'
traditional search and seizure cases, law enforcement's mere discovery of a
lock does not end the inquiry. 6 Rather, the state must proceed to question
the consenting party about his or her knowledge of and access to the locked
area before it establishes what kind of authority the consenter really has.
Ultimately, there is no compelling reason why computers should be treated
any differently.

Microsoft currently has a 90% market share. See Gregg Keizer, Windows Market Share
1, 2oo8, http://www.computerworld.
For information
com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9121938.
about Windows' password protection features, see Microsoft, Protect Your Computer with a
Password, http://windowshelp.microsoft.com/Windows/en-US/Help/22e3e8c4-39c3-48o293dI-816o94booed41033.mspx (last visited Feb. i3, 2009).
123 Excluding Microsoft, Macintosh and Linux make up the bulk of the market share
for operating systems. See Market Share, Operating System Market Share, http://marketshare.
hitslink.com/operating-system-market-share.aspx?qprid=8 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). For
information concerning Mac OS X's password capabilities, see Apple, MAC OS X: Changing
or Resetting an Account Password, http://support.apple.com/kb/HT 274 (last visited Feb. z8,
122

Dives Below 90% Forthe FirstTime, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec.

2009).
124

United States v. Andrus, 483 E3d 711, 718 (ioth Cir. 2007).
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ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Location of the Computer
The location of the computer in the household gives an obvious
indication as to whether or not common authority exists. A search initiated
upon a computer located in a locked bedroom would not withstand
scrutiny under apparent authority, whereas a computer located in an
open access area of the house very well may. This distinction was taken
into consideration in Buckner, where the court deemed it pertinent that
the computer was located in a common area of the house and no one was
excluded from using it.1" 7 It also played a factor in the Andrus decision,
as the majority relied on the fact that Dr. Andrus had open access to the
defendant's bedroom to help establish valid apparent authority." 8 Other
cases to consider computer location include United States v. Morgan"'gwhere the computer was located in a common area of the house and the
wife maintained she occasionally used the computer-and United States v.
Smith,""0 where the court found apparent authority because the desk and
computer were in a common area surrounded by children's toys. Clearly,
the location of the computer should be a factor taken into consideration by
courts in reviewing the officers' reliance on the given apparent authority.
Moreover, if the computer happens to be situated in a location similar to
that in Andrus, state agents should proceed with caution to be sure that the
consenting party truly has common authority.
B. The Scope of the Consent Given
As another facet of maintaining the validity of an apparent authority
search, officers must ensure that the consenter is, in fact, consenting to the
search of the computer along with the rest of the house. This issue did not
appear to be of concern in Andrus, as officers clearly asked to search both
the house and any computers in it."1 However, any consent that is not
broad enough or ambiguously broad when first given can certainly work
to invalidate a search. In United States v. Turner, for example, the scope of
the defendant's consent to search his apartment for evidence of an intruder
who broke into a neighboring apartment was exceeded when it extended
to a search of his computer files. 32 Similarly, commentators analyzing the

127 United States v. Buckner, 473 E3d 551, 555-56 (4th Cir. 2007).
128 United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 721 (Ioth Cir. 2007).

129 United States v. Morgan, 435 E3 d 66o, 662-64 (6th Cir. 2006).
130 United States v. Smith, 27 F. Supp. 2d I I I, i 116 (C.D. I11.1998).
131 Andrus, 483 F3d at 713.
132 United States v. Turner, 169 E3d 84, 86-87 (st Cir. 1999).
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Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Jimeno133 have stated that "[t]he
scope of a consent search may not exceed the scope of the consent given.
The scope of consent is determined by asking how a reasonable person
would have understood the conversation between the officer and the
suspect or third party when consent was given."1 "
Finally, it is clear that scope matters even in the context of a warrant.
The Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carey held that an officer
exceeded the scope of a warrant authorizing a computer search for evidence
of drug crimes when the officer found and continued to search for child
pornography on a defendant's computer.135 Applying this decision to the
computer context, officers must be cautious not to take statements from
a consenter allowing them to "search the entire house" or "search the
apartment" without something more as permission to search a roommate's
or housemate's entire computer. Relying on the same rationale from Block
and Pressler,these searches would not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
C. The Invasiveness of the Technology Used
Kyllo makes clear that the more invasive a technology and the more
likely the public is unaware of the technology's existence, the more probable
it is that a warrantless search will be overturned on Fourth Amendment
grounds.'36 Furthermore, the decision indicates that the court's role
with new privacy-invasive technology is to protect citizens where "the
technology in question is not in general public use."' 37 The ability of new
technologies to invade and slowly destroy individuals' privacy is virtually
limitless, and it remains doubtful whether software like EnCase is well
known to the public at large. In fact, EnCase may just be the tip of the
iceberg--currently, allowing law enforcement to use software like EnCase
is analogous to merely allowing them to bypass a low quality padlock on a
locker. Still, with constantly improving technology (especially in the field
of password protection), future software or hardware combinations will
likely be even more adept at bypassing the latest encryption or even the
most serious efforts to keep our computer files private. Today we allow the
police to sidestep a padlock, tomorrow it is a steel-reinforced doorway.

133 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 ('991).
134 Jeremy Calsyn et al., Investigationand PolicePractices:WarrantlessSearches andSeizures,
86 Gao. L.J. 1214, 1257-58 (1998).
135 United States v. Carey,' 72 F3d 1268, i276 (i999).
136 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
137 Id. at 34.
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CONCLUSION

In adapting the concept of apparent authority and its limitations to the
area of computer searches, the added requirements for law enforcement
should be simple and easy to follow. In apparent authority searches, officials
need only check for password protection before initiating the search, and, if
such protection exists, inquire into its nature. 38 When taken in conjunction
with the fact that 1) password protection is entirely commonplace for
computers today, 2) the burden of this additional inquiry is minimal
in terms of both time and effort, and 3) not making the inquiry creates
the incentive for authorities to bypass the most objective and important
question as to whether apparent authority exists, the response is clear: as
part of establishing the validity of a third-party consent-based search of a
computer under Illinois v. Rodriguez, officers should be required to follow
the Andrus dissent's recommendations.

138 United States v. Andrus, 483 E3d 711, 725 (ioth Cit. 2007).

